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This thesis investigates the Selected Acquisition
Reporting (SAR) System in order to evaluate its effec-
tiveness, Significant problem areas associated with the
SAR and the reporting criteria of DOD Instruction ?000.3
(series) are examined.
The data presented were collected by telephonic survey
and personal interview with users, reviewers 1 and
producers of the SAR. This v/as augmented by analysis
of actual SARs for a representative sample of Major Navy
Acquisition Programs. The major issues examined included:
timeliness of the SAR, Project Managers* reporting chain of
command, the SAR review process, cost estimating procedures,
escalation and cost growth, role of the SAR, project
"optimism, " rewards and pressures associated with project
management, Congressional Committee views of the
SARs, and the background and history of the SAR.
Although many of these issues require further study,
proposals are presented to improve the effectiveness of
the SAR and alleviate some of the controversy that now
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The past decade has seen the acquisition of major
weapons systems characterized by cost growth in almost
every major program. Much study has been devoted to the
cost growth issue and its impact by such organizations
as the Government Accounting Office (GAO) , the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) , the Commission on Government
Procurement, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel and most re-
cently the Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Review Council
(IMMARC) .
Current austere defense budgets coupled with severe
inflation and spiralling weapons systems costs have created
extreme pressure at all levels of acquisition management
to check and/or reduce the incidence of weapons system
cost growth. During the involvement in the Vietnam war
and to a lesser degree today, members of Congress have
found it politically expedient to attack the management
of defense systems. These attacks serve to intensify
the pressure at every level of management within the DOD.
A series of budget, program review, and cost information
systems have been introduced which were designed to
improve the weapons system acquisitions process and con-
trol costs. They include the Development Concept Paper
(DC?) , the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
10

(PPBS), and the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) . These
have had a profound impact on the Defense Procurement
Establishment. They have provided additional information
to assist the DOD and/or the Congress in improving the
acquisition process. This thesis will limit its discussion
to the SAR system and more specifically to the SAR as it
applies to and is used for the reporting of Navy weapons
systems. The author will evaluate the Navy SAR system
and discuss its effectiveness in presenting the true status
of the programs. Major problem areas will be identified
and specific issues raised by the GAO concerning the
SAR will be discussed. Due to the time constraints imposed
on this effort, detailed investigation into all problem
areas was not possible. However, based on the results of
this study, specific recommendations will be made for
improvement of the Navy SAR system. Specific questions
addressed are listed at the end of Chapter II.
11

II. SAR DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND
A. DESCRIPTION
The SAR is a quarterly report originated by the
Project Manager (P/M) of each major weapons system pro-
curement which summarizes the cost, schedule, and per-
formance data for the program. Major procurements are
those "requiring a total cumulative financing for Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) in excess of
$50 million or cumulative production investment in excess
of $200 million. 1' Reporting is normally initiated on a
program after it has been approved by DSARC II and been
included in the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) . DSARC II
is the second major decision point in the life of a new
system. It is conducted by the Secretary of Defense and
is a comprehensive program review required for authori-
zation of full scale development of the new weapon. The
FYDP is the DOD forecast of future expenditures.
B. HISTORY
The requirement for the SAR was first established by
the DOD Instruction 7OOO.3 dated 23 February 1968 . Ini-
tially the SAR was designed and intended only for the use
of its sponsor, the Assistant Secretary of Defense





. A total of eight DOD programs were included
in the 1968 experimental phase of the SAR program.
In the early part of 1969 Secretary of Defense
Laird articulated the requirement to be regularly advised
of the status of major acquisitions. At that time the
external criticism of defense system acquisition management
plus growing concern over related cost growth presented
the need for feedback information which could be compared
against budget, performance, and schedule plans to high-
light program status and problem areas. The SAR was
recognized as a potential vehicle that would fulfill such
a requirement. The SAR directives were revised to reflect
the new user and the program moved out of the experimental
phase
,
During approximately the same time frame GAO and
Congressional interest in acquisition was intensified as
a result of hearings on Government procurement, the Anti-
2Ballistic Missile System and the C-5A. These systems
were experiencing significant growth in cost estimates.
In April, 1969* Senator Stennis, Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, requested that DOD
furnish his committee, on a recurring basis, progress data
on major weapons systems which were in various stages of
procurement. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
requested that the services nominate additional systems
DOD Cost Research Symposium Report, 2k March 1970,
Volume I, Page 4.
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for reporting, using as the criteris, "Those systems
which might experience technical difficulties and/or
cost growth. nJ The SAR program and directives were again
revised to reflect the Congressional user. On 3 September,
1971, the current DOD Instruction 7000.3 was issued.
In April, 1972 1 Change 1 was issued and today that remains
the official SAR reference document. That change was not
a major one. Most of the major changes occurred in the
1970-71 time frame.
Since 1972 the Instruction has not been revised;
however, a large number of memoranda changing the reporting
format and content have been issued. Currently there are
^K) programs on the list of Congressional SARs . Eight
other programs submit SARs to the DOD level only.
C. SAR PURPOSE
The Secretary of Defense considers the SAR to be, "The
official DOD source to be used as a basis for outside
... h
reporting on weapons system acquisition. " It is the
key recurring summary by which DOD reports to the appro-
priate committees of the Congress on the progress of
selected major weapons systems.
The SAR, in theory, provides the "textbook" or
classic example of a management information control
mechanism. Planning and current estimates are
presented for quantity, performance, and technical
3 IBID, P k.
* IBID, F 3. lt¥

characteristics, schedules, and cost. Variance analysis
and explanations are presented for most areas where de-
viations from the plan are encountered. This, by
definition, is the function of a control sub system in
a "traditional" management system. The feedback loop in
the SAR system is accomplished when the reviewed SAR is
signed, sent to the Congress, and a copy returned to the
originator (P/M) for use as the base submission of the
next SAR 90 days later.
D. SAR CRITICISM
Despite its potential as the "ideal" management infor-
mation tool, the SAR system has come under an increasing
amount of criticism. The Congressional user has questioned
the accuracy of the SAR and further criticized it for being
"untimely. Some project managers have indicated they
felt the SAR was a waste of time. Some DOD reviewing
officials have expressed the view that the SAR was unreal-
istic. The Commission on Government reported on management
information systems such as the SAR:
Congress often cannot act as a credible and sensible
check on an agency because acquisition programs provide
no handles to enable Congress to interrelate the purpose
of the new system and the dollars being spent on them
with national policies and needs. Instead data is pre-
sented to Congress in "traditional" forms, inviting
attention to already defined products and annual budget
incruments that finance development and production.
6
^Comptroller General of the U.S., "How to Improve the
Selected Acquisition Reporting System," 27 March, 1975'
Federal Contracts Report, Number 4-70, 5 March 1973 » Page A-17
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GAO applied similar criticism directly to the SAR
in its 25 March 1975 report to the Congress when it
questioned why the SAR does not compare system performance
7
with the enemy threat and national need.' Other Congres-
sional criticism was recorded in the House Appropriations
Committee report of 11 September 1972. The Committee
noted that the SAR:
. .
. was untimely
... had no "audit trail" existing to explain differences
between development and planning estimates
. . . has no firm guidelines against which to measure
additional procurement costs
• • • has no statement to estimate the probability of the
weapons system achieving its primary mission or meeting
o
its original contract specifications.
E. QUESTIONS
Specifically the author will address questions asso-
ciated with function, concept, and improvements of the SAR
. Does the SAR accurately transmit the true status
of the program? (Chapter IV)
. What is/should be the role of the SAR? (Chapter V)
. Is the report timely? (Chapter VI)
. Is there too much review? (Chapter VI)
. Should the P/M report directly to the Congress via
the SAR? (Chapter VI)
7
' Comptroller General of the U.S., P. 6.
o
Navy, Marine Corps Acquis tion Review Committee Report,
January 1975 1 Pave VII - 58.
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. . . How are the cost data computed? (Chapter VII)
. . . What is the impact of escalation? (Chapter IX)
. . . Could the SAR be improved and, if so, how? (Chapter XII)
The author will attempt to answer these and other
important questions and criticism of the SAR.
There are other questions that have been raised con-
cerning the SAR; however, due to the time constraints on
this research effort, only those issues considered by the





In order to adequately conduct research into the SAR
the author found it necessary to visit the Washington D.C.
area to interview the users, producers, and reviewers of
the SAR. First he conducted a comprehensive analysis of
the Navy SARs on file at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) Library. Next, intensive library research was con-
ducted to locate and familiarize the researcher with past
and current literature in the field of Selected Acquisition
Reports. Although visits to the Stanford, NASA Ames,
and Naval Postgraduate School Libraries produced no
literature specifically covering the subject, the library
material examined did serve to broaden the author's know-
ledge in the field of Systems Acquisition.
Next an extensive telephonic survey was conducted on
a large number of individuals who were users, reviewers,
and producers of SARs. This served to provide an effective
foundation for the ensuing interviews by stimu-
lating those called to consider the basic ideas of the
research prior to my arrival.
B. INTERVIEWS
The following organizations assisted in the research
by participating in interviews with the researcher; GAO,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for
18

Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) , OASD (Comptroller)
,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for Financial
Management, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) OP-96D and
OP 902, and Chief of Naval Material (MAT-023) . Project
Offices/Project Managers interviewed were: F-l^,




IV. INITIAL PERCEPTION AND ANALYSIS
A. MIS CONCPETION
The author's initial perception was that the SAR was
extremely weak and ineffective as a management information
system. This notion was based mainly on the amount of
criticism the system had received from various levels of
the users, producers, and reviewers of the SAR. Part
of this misconception stemmed from the assumption that
most Navy Project Managers would be erroneously presenting
their program in the SAR as one with no problems.
The initial methodology for testing the effectiveness
of the SAR was to analyze a representative sample of the
SARs in the NPS Library to determine how the P/M presented
the status of his program. The author intended to gather
data demonstrating that a large number of the major pro-
grams presented a "completely optimistic" status when,
in fact, they were experiencing considerable difficulty.
If historical data, which were available at the time the
SAR was published, could have been produced which proved
the existence of project difficulties, even though the
P/M reported an overly optimistic program status, then
the point could have been made that the SAR system had
a major flaw which rendered its effectiveness
questionable
.
It was logical then to examine programs thai: had
experienced known cost, performance, or schedule
20

difficulties. Before discussing the survey results, it
would be helpful for later analysis to discuss briefly
some other forces which impact on the status reporting.
B. P/M REWARDS AND PRESSURES
The problem of truly accurate status reporting and
P/M "optimism" was a more complex issue that might
immediately be apparent. It involved not only the me-
chanics of executing the implementing DOD Instruction
concerning SARs but subtly and perhaps more important
the behaviorial aspects of the rewards, career patterns,
and measures of success associated with Project Manage-
ment. As one interviewee stated, "The P/M is rewarded
for putting ships in the water or aircraft in the air.
He can't give pessimistic estimates in the SAR for fear
9
of the program being cancelled. " y Another said, "He
(the P/M) must keep the project alive at all costs."
Most weapons are needed to meet an operational threat
on a "close" time schedule. Couple that fact with the
lengthy procedures for initiating a new program plus the
austere budget climate and you have the genesis of the
CNO program sponsors pressure on the P/M to "make the
system work." This pressure plus career enhancement, and
rewards for delivering the system to the fleet could
q




easily motivate the P/M to present the system status in
an "optimistic" light. Lourette further showed that
these kinds of pressure induce the P/M to make program
decisions that later result in cost growth.
C. "OPTIMISM"
The quarterly recurring nature of the SAR gives the
P/M further opportunity to exercise some "optimism."
The intense Congressional and DOD concern over cost
growth plus the nature of the strongly motivated, highly
dedicated, and enthusiastic officers in P/M billets in
most cases leads them to exercise their best management
efforts toward preventing such cost increases. The
Financial Manager for one program whose SARs recently
showed a significant unforecasted cost increase stated,
"The PM knew 18 months ahead of time that the contractor
was forecasting this increase but he vowed to control the
12program in such a way as to not let it happen."
An associated subtle influence on publishing the true
status of the program deals with the assignment and rota-
tion of PMs. Some major programs may have a 10-15 year
acquisition cycle. During that time the average PM may
Lourette, Richard J. , "The Relationship Between Pressure
on the System Program Director and the Growth of Weapons
Systems Cost Estimates," Boston, Harvard University, 1969.
12 Name withheld by request.
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have a 2-3 year total in the Project Office. These
rotations offer an excellent opportunity for the outgoing
PM to exercise some of the above mentioned "optimism."
If there is a problem, it is relatively easy to defer it
in hopes the new PM will have to handle it. When the
outgoing PM moves on, his fitness report (i.e. reward)
normally reflects the known program status at detachment.
That being the case, the incentive then certainly exists
for optimism. When the problem later surfaces the in-
coming PM cannot be held accountable for the problems of
the previous manager. This was the thrust behind
Secretary Packards guidance concerning the selection and
13
assignment of the PM. Progress has been made m this
area but further improvement is needed. However, it is
easy to see that the top performing PM who is motivated
toward continued promotion could easily be tempted to
leave the program with the illusion of "no problems."
Current PM rotation plans call for changing at major
program milestones such as DSARC II or DSARC III (pro-
duction decision) . These major reviews should "clear
the air" of most major problems and alleviate PM "optimism."
D. FINDINGS
With this foundation the author analyzed the complete
NPS SAR files on approximately half of the current list
of Navy Programs reporting under DOD Instruction 7000. 3.
13 DOD Directive 5000.1.
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The author's initial perception about the presentation
of a no problem status was quickly disproved. There were a
few examples of "optimism" found. The only sample found
that supported the author's original perception was:
"The development program is on schedule and within
14budget constraints."
The following quarter this project reported a significant
cost growth in the total projected outlay to acquire the
system. The small incidence of such "optimism" dis-
proved my initial perception.
In fact, the majority of the programs studied pre-
sented varying degrees of problems ranging from very
minor to moderately severe
.
For example one major program's SAR reported at
the 20% completion point as follows:
Progress reports based on the 12 month or more delay
in delivery addressed in (a recent SAR)* indicate con-
tinued slippage in the detail design issues, reducing
the Navy's level of confidence that the revised schedule
delivery dates would be met. The contractor has incurred
an additional 7i months slippage for the first unit to
12 months slippage^ for the last unit delivery in (his
latest proposal) . *15
Concerning the cost estimate on another program, the SAR
reported that the contractor has:
(1) Expected to go to ceiling, and (2) would propose
a new escalation clause which would provide escalation
payments over the full construction period - about one
year longer than planned. 1°
Ik
Program name withheld to avoid classification.






Even the most casual observer could discern that
these programs were experiencing difficulties from such
SAR comments. The programs mentioned are still active
and currently are experiencing further cost growth.
Most programs which did experience cost grov/th and
schedule difficulties then clearly did not present an
absence of problems in their reporting. While there
were other areas that detracted from the effectiveness
of the SAR, P/M statement of no problems was not one
of them.
E. INTERVIEW RESULTS
Based on the high potential and rewards for expressing
the program "optimistically" the author did not dismiss
his initial perception solely on the basis of the analysis
of SARs . Every interviewer v/as questioned as to his
impression as to whether the SAR presented the true status
of the program. As earlier criticism might suggest, the
spectrum of answers varied from "extremely accurate" to
"almost inaccurate" in presenting the true status. Again
the bias of user/producer was evident; the producers
generally believing the SAR to be accurate and the user
calling them ineffective. The SAR reviewers generally believed
the SAR to be effective. The author concluded that the
SARs were reasonably accurate with a slight tendency to-
ward the "optimistic" side. This was based on the extensive
review procedure for program status; not only the SAR
review but DSARC and periodic status reviews. These
25

reviews are keyed to revealing problem areas so that,
while the P/M might be able to cover up cost growth for
a time, they will eventually be disclosed. Additionally
the P/M°s job could be on the line by the manner in which
he deals with the Congress.
One critic stated that the P/M can "tell them (Con-
gress) what he wants them to know - up to a point." While
this appeared to be true, the author does not consider
this to be a major weakness in the system because it gives
the P/M incentive and opportunity to exercise strong
control over the potential problem. In the dynamic and
ever changing acquisition environment many problems
can be solved without the need of reporting them in the
SAR. The author submits that reporting every potential
problem on the SAR would be detrimental to effective
project management for the following reason: The NMARC
Report stated that currently the P/M denotes approximately
30% of his time to briefings, reviews and response to
17questions. ' If he included every problem and potential
problem the results would not only most likely be exceeding
the 13 page size limit imposed on the SAR by DOD In-
struction 7000. 3 » but more important it would cause a
significant increase in the amount of time the P/M
spends in "justifying his existence" because of increased
program reviews, briefings, and correspondence.
1
^ NMARC Report, Volume II, Exhibit III- 13
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The final point on this issue is that the P/M can
carry his optimism only so far because of the effective-
ness of the Congressional Committees in obtaining infor-
mation on program status from other sources; therefore
the P/M must be ready to justify his status during
annual hearings . He can present his program on the








The next area considered was the role of the SAR.
The question used to trigger dialogue on this subject
during interviews was
;
"Do you think the SAR should give a financial state-
ment or balance sheet type status of the project as of
a date or should it be a forecasting document to predict
future problem areas?"
As might be perceived by the reader familiar with
the acquisition environment the answers were again biased
depending on whether the interviewee was a user or pro-
ducer of the SAR.
B. USER DESIRES
The Congressional Staff users were very polarized
toward the latter concept. One stated that, "He wanted
a document of about 5 pages in length that he could refer
to and use for asking questions during annual hearings."
He felt that the SAR should be a document that would
highlight the problem areas in the program for the benefit
of the Congress. He further expressed the view that the
DOD was trying to hide information by not making the
SAR that kind of document.
Berry and Peckham in their thesis concerning P/M




points relevant to the SAR. First, the P/M is very
vulnerable in front of the Congress. They found that a
P/M could be "fired" if members of the Congress express
their displeasure to the appropriate people.
Secondly, the Congressional Committees normally cut
funds from programs rather than add to them. Therefore
the implication is that the best the P/M can do as a
result of his committee appearance is maintain the pro-
gram and hope for no cuts . The rational P/M then could
be expected to present his program only in the status
that he can reasonably defend during hearings and not
volunteer any potential problem areas that might cause
controversey or give reason to reduce the program. The
earlier discussion concerning the results of presenting
minor problems and the devastating results in terms of
intervention by middle and upper layers of management
applies to this question.
C. ORIGINATORS CONCEPTS
On the other hand, the originators (P/M) felt that
the SAR was similiar to a balance sheet which gave the
status as of the end of a reporting period. The NMARC
agreed with this philosophy. Of SAR it said:
-] o
Robt. C. Berry and Daniel E. Peckham, Interactions of
Navy Program Managers with Congressional Committees




The reports are sirailiar in concept to the quarterly
financial reports of the American Business Community
to their stock holders and creditors. '
DOD Instruction 7000.3 states that the SARs are:
. . ^.
standard, comprehensive, summary Status Reports
on major defense systems for management within the De-
partment of Defense. 21
Since the instruction is vague on this point it
appears to leave it to the discretion of the individual
P/M.
One might argue that a comprehensive, summary status
report should include every known and anticipated problem
area. From a theoretical point of view there could be
considerable support for such an idea. Unfortunately the
political realities of the acquisition environment make
such a practice not only difficult to police but completely
impractical for the same reasons discussed in connection
with DOD and Congressional involvement and the resulting
demands on the P/M. Such involvement results in excessive
time telling them what they want to know and it discourages
initiative and imagination in terms of DOD Directive
5000.1 with regard to decentralizing authority and
responsibility for the acquisition of a system.
19 NMARC Report, Volume I, P. VII-58.
20 Emphasis Added.






While the Congressional Committee Staffs may promote
the idea that "if you cleanse your soul and tell us all
your problems we'll help you," the realities and their
record of previous dealings with P/Ms have proven quite
different as Peckham and Berry found. The main method
available to help the P/lfl involve the area of increasing
appropriations. The record will show very few instances
of that and many more examples of funding reductions;
therefore the P/M would be expected to act in a manner
which would provide the minimum number of problem areas
to the Congress during discussions and SAR status reporting.
E. FINDINGS
Respondings to the Congressional user's desires in
terms of format and content of the SAR might at first
glance appear to be prudent. However, the author believes
that the SAR's present role of informing the higher levels
of DOD and Navy of the program's status is of vital
importance. Therefore, the SAR should remain in its
present format and intent. This idea was expressed by
Secretary Packard in a letter 9 February, 1970* Letter
to Senator Stennis where, in discussing the SAR, he stated,
"Our objective has been to develop a report which fairly
describes to key executives of the DOD and Congress
the status of our acquisitions."
22 Berry and Peckham.
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A good reason for retaining the present SAR role
was expressed by a high ranking Navy Financial Management
SAR Reviewer who stated that "since the inception of the
SAR, appropriations sponsors and the OPNAV Staff are much
"better versed on the financial status of the program.
Previously they got "up to speed" only at budget time and
even then, some of them not so good."'-^ He further
indicated that the review process (v/hich will be discussed
later) and the very existence of the SAR have served to
accomplish this increased awareness. The financial,
technical, and schedule information in the SAR are all
required to provide and retain this improved state of
awareness. Based on this discussion and the political
realities as earlier discussed, the author believes that
the SAR should retain its current role, that of a balance
sheet status report.
It has proven to be quite effective in helping all
levels of the DOD to be better informed and thus provided
the potential for more effective management. The question
of whether or not the higher levels actually do a better
job because of the information and data in the SAR is
beyond the scope and time constraints of the authors'
effort. It would, however, make an interesting and worth-
while future thesis topic.
While the author does not wish to prolong the be-





role of the SAR which exists between the producer and
the user, he would point out that these steadfast
opposing views offer some insight into the criticism,
dislike, and condemnation of the SAR by both groups.
3°-j

VI. SAR REVIEW AND TIMELINESS
The next issue discussed during each interview
was the SAR review process and the suggestion that the
P/M submit the report directly to Congress. GAO recom-
mended such a procedure in a recent report.
It seems to us that with the emphasis the DOD has
placed on assigning flag rank officers to manage major
acquisition programs and with the increased emphasis in
the past few years placed on developing rewarding careers
in project management, it would be reasonable to expect
the Project Officer to assume responsibility for the SAR
content. We recommend that responsibility for the SAR
preparation be delegated to a single individual in a
responsible management position. The individual should
be held responsible for the reasonableness, completeness,
and accuracy of the SAR. Further, we recommend that the
Project Officer (P/M) 2^ be delegated this responsibility
and that he certify as to the credibility of the SAR. ^
The author was surprised to learn that the majority
of the Project Managers interviewed stated that they
preferred retaining the review system as it currently is.
Their stated reasoning mainly centered on report standard-
ization, the Review Committee catching errors, and
matching the budget data with the PYDP , POM, and PDM
Data. While proof could not be obtained, the author
perceived that project personnel felt a certain pro-
tection or shield from pressure due to the fact that the
Deputy Secretary of Defense currently releases the reports
to Congress. If reporting requirements were revised to
2k ...Clarification added.
2$ Comptroller General of the U.S., p. 17.
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make the P/M report directly to Congress this buffer
would be removed.
A. RATIONALE
In considering the levels of review and the review
process as it currently exists, the over-riding fact
that must be remembered is that the acquisition team is
a military organization and that the P/M is subordinate
to the Chief of Naval Material, the CNO , and the DOD.
To promote good order, discipline, and continuity the
military chain of command must be preserved. Lest this
sound like a "motherhood" statement, consider the impact
and disorder that could and likely would occur if the
P/M took every little problem to Congress. More specifi-
cally consider the consequences if for instance OPNAV
or DOD wasn't giving the P/M all the support he desired
because of the adverse impact the requested assets would
have on other programs of equal priority. We have already
seen that the P/M is rewarded for making his program
succeed. If his parochial interest led him to reporting
his dissatisfaction in the SAR directly to Congress and
he gained Congressional support for the request DOD,
OPNAV, NAVMAT, and the cognizant Systems Command would
be forced to respond, probably at the expense of other
important programs. Additionally the author perceives




There is one Navy example of such direct dealing
with the Congress. That is the Navy Nuclear Pov/er
Program headed by Admiral Rickover who is well known
by the Congress and renowned for his direct dealings
with them. While it would be difficult to fault the
results of his program in terms of the hardv/are acquired
and the management success acclaimed, the methodology
has created a significant amount of stress within the
Navy acquisition community.
The timeliness, or lack there of, in the SAR is
directly related to the review process. SECNAV Instruction
of 26 February 1972 is the Navy SAR implementing directive
and gives insight into the review process. The schedule
for review is included as Table I. The reason for the
significant amount of time required for review (currently
50 days to Congress) is more easily appreciated when
considering the levels of review, the detail review
process, and the number of Navy programs currently on
the SAR list; a total of 23 systems.
B. REVIEW TEAM
NAVCOMPT, OPNAV, and NAVMAT provided the members of
the NAW SAR review team. This team met with each Project
Manager commencing on the 19th day following the "as of
date" (Table I). Since there was only one review team and
certain members were required to review every major
SAR system, the schedule during review week was very
tight. The author learned that each program was alloted
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REVIEW SCHEDULE FOR NAVY PROGRAMS
(1) Submit advance copies of Congressional (Group I) to
CNO (OP - 902) no later than close of business on the
18th working day after the "as of date."
(2) Commence NAVCOMPT/OPNAV/CNM joint review of advance
copies by 19th working day after "as of date."
(3) Upon completion of joint review, CNO (Program Sponsor)
forwards comments to CNM (to include due date of
original and final copies)
.
W NAVSYSCOMS/Project Managers correct/modify reports.
(5) Originals submitted to CNO via CNM as directed in
(3) above.
(6) CNO submit originals to NAVCOMPT no later than 5
days prior to the due date in OSD.
(7) Secretariat submission to OSD in accordance with DOD
Instruction 70OO.3.
(8) Submit non-Congressional (Group II) advance copies
no later than close of business on the 32nd working
day after the "as of date."
(9) Commence NAVCOMPT/OPNAV/CNM joint review of advance
copies by 33^d working day after "as of date."
(10) Submit final SARs to OSD no later than k$ days after
the "as of date .
"
(11) ASD (Comptroller) distributes Navy SARs to Assistant
Secretaries of Defense for I&l, DDR&E, PA&E, and
Comptroller for review.






1-2 hours for review. At the end of that time if issues
remained that could not be resolved, they
were coordinated and staffed with the project officer
following the review week. The point was that the review
team had to keep the review schedule going. The priority
of the review process was to make sure that the SAR data were
in agreement with other budget data such as the PDM,
POM, and FYOP. The author was told that in all cases the
Navy review coordinated changes with the P/M prior to
executing them.
At DOD, the review process consisted of routing
the SARs to those offices listed in Table I rather than
forming a review team. If one of the offices disagreed
with information in the SAR they submitted an "issue
paper" to ASD (Comptroller) who was responsible for
coordinating and staffing the correction or change. The
ASD (Comptroller) Staff stated that all changes were
coordinated with Navy reviewers and the cognizant P/M.
Several project offices reported that this was not always
the case and that changes had been made without the
P/Ms knowledge. The author believes that such action was
most unwise since the P/M must be able to defend the SAR
during Congressional hearings and didn't always know the
reason for the change.
The ultimate releasing authority is the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense who signs the SARs for transmittal to
Congress. The author found that in the face of all the
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emphasis on informing Congress via the SAR, only 12
copies of each was sent to "Capitol Hill."
C . FINDINGS
It is the author's opinion that a joint review process
is essential to the SAR since the Secretary of Defense
considers it to be the official DOD source for use as
the basis for outside reporting on weapons system acquisi-
tion. It is therefore important that SAR data matches
other budget data. The offices represented on the review
team are the agencies tasked with budget matters and have
the best qualified people to insure agreement. A fall-out
of this review process is some semblance of standardization
among reports.
The fact that certain key individuals were required
to review all Navy SARs was found to be a problem and
one major cause of the length of the review period. While
the author and several of the project personnel questioned
had a personal distaste for a review of that length, the
process does appear to be necessary in order to present
a unified position to the Congress by insuring that budget
documents and information reports are in agreement.
The fact that SAR submission to the Congress is un-
timely cannot be questioned; i.e., 60 days following the
close of the quarter and approximately 5 months from the
beginning of the reporting period. Assistant Secretary




of Defense (Comptroller) McClary in his 18 February 1975
memo to the various Assistant Secretaries of the Military
Departments (FM) directed that the 31 march, 1975, SARs
be submitted to OSD 35 days after the end of the reporting
27period. ' This change is part of the effort to reduce
the total submission time to the Congress. The current
draft revision to DOD Instruction 7000. 3 had not been
published at this writing but it is anticipated that it
will call for a total submission time of 5° days for
Congressional SARs; down from the current 60 days. This
appears to be no more than a token effort at reducing
the submission time. As stated in the previous section
the review process is necessary. The review queue is
created by the requirement for a certain group of key
people to review all programs. Since there are 23 Navy
SAR programs and each may take up to 2 hours to review,
the review team is physically time constrained as to
the number of programs they can and must review. The
problem is compounded at the OSD level where each ASD
must review not only all the Navy programs, but also the
Army and Air Force SARs in approximately one week.
D. RECOMMENDATION
The author suggests that if the delay in submitting
the reports following the "as of" dates is severe enough




in the eyes of the Congressional user to warrant sub-
stantial change , an alternative approach would be to
establish a "steady stream" type submission procedure.
Under this concept each P/M would still report quarterly,
but instead of having all reports submitted in a group
at the end of the quarters, one or two programs per week
would submit a SAR. For instance the F-lk and the
DD-963 might report the first week, the Harpoon and the
CVAN the second week, etc. This would remove the review-
ing queue and reduce the delay in submission. It is
estimated that the review period could be significantly
reduced from its present nine weeks. The author believes
that the total review could be completed and the report
forwarded to Congress in as little as two-three weeks.
An associated finding dealt with the apparent
use of the SAR. Almost universally, the interviewers
stated that the SAR was not used to drive or make decisions
The author could only conclude that this implies the SAR
was used for background information to complete the total
picture of program status. Annually the GAO conducted
a program review and submitted a report to the Congress.
Additionally the Congressional Committee Staffs reported
that they had "many contacts." They refused to identify
the names or types of these contacts. Therefore the SAR
appeared to be one of the key information sources con-
cerning program status, but not the only one. This being
the case, the actual arrival of the SAR would not seem
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to be time critical except to insure that the current
status v/as available for the annual hearings.
While this would be a significant change in terms
of the traditional aspects of the SAR (i.e., conventional
thinking associated with the end of the quarter, close
of the fiscal year, etc.) the effect would be to relieve
congestion at all levels; the reviewer, the producer, and
the user levels
. At the SAR producer level this would
also relieve the pressure in the NAVAIR and NAVSEA cost
divisions. As will be discussed later, the bulk of the
cost data for most all major projects is originated and
computed in one of these two centers.
At the user end of the pipeline, it seems unlikely
to the author that the Congressional Committees are
able to digest 5° SARs in a single group. This "steady
stream" submission should not have any detrimental effect
on Congressional Committee operations or hearings.
E. CONTINUOUS CHANGE
One serious problem area with the SAR system which
was discovered was the continual change to the reporting
procedures . In examining the policy changes recorded in
one of the Project Offices it was observed that since the
issuance of DOD Instruction 7OOO.3 in September, 1971
(ammended by change 1 in April 1972) , reporting and
format change memoranda have been issued on the average
of once per quarter. The majority of these changes oc-
cured in the past year. Because of this, Project
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financial personnel have waited till the quarter was
completed before commencing their preparation of the SAR.
This has been a problem in shortening the submission
time but practically, it has been necessary because of
the frequent changes, In one case as many as k change
memoranda were issued to the Project Officer between the
end of the reporting period and the date the SARs were
finally submitted to the Congress! Each modified the
guidance of the previous memorandum and two of these were
dated just one day apart . In that instance, the final
guidance, requiring another revision to the report v/as
issued by the ASD (Comptroller) approximately two weeks
after the reports were to have been due to the Congress.
F. ORIGIN OF CHANGES
Many changes are as a result of requests for a par-
ticular format or type information from the Congressional
user. The P/Ms are aware of this. This knowledge plus
the politically volatile nature of the SAR fed by all
the pressure and interest from GAO and Congress has
resulted in the P/Ms having a dislike for SAR preparation.
Extreme displeasure results when the P/M has to resubmit
due to a change in the reporting criteria. It has been
recognized that the SAR system has been changed consider-
28
ably and improved since its inception, The author found
that SAR improvement panels/committees had met in the
p o
GA.0 Letter to Congressman Herbert, 30 Oct. 1973
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first three years of the life of the SAR and again in
the Fall of 197^. Considerable effort was expended by
these groups in gathering the inputs of all users, re-
viewers, and producers of the SAR concerning improvements
to the system. The findings were examined by the ASD
(Comptroller) and other DOD level reviewers and the
applicable portions included in the subsequent instruc-
tion and policy revisions. However the continual changes
to the rules had an adverse effect on the readability,
continuity, and understanding of the SAR.
G. CONTINUITY
The NMARC panel recognized that refinements and
guidance from higher authority will cause changes to the
SAR format:
However, the timing of such instructions has led to
additional work (or rework) requirements on the Program
Offices and the Navy Comptroller's Staff and have re-
sulted in SAR submissions at dates later than desired.
This problem is further compounded when one considers
the impact on the reader of a report that is in a continual
state of change. The continuity is broken, the ability ^o
to compare information (and the basis for its presentation)
from one report to another is hampered, and the creditabil-
ity of the data is questioned .3°
The author concurs and found that the problem of
continuity was especially evident during the review of
entire SAR files. Without the group of policy memos on
SAR changes it was difficult if not impossible to trace
29 .
' Amplification supplied.
3° NMARC Report, Vol. I, p. VII-61
il4

cost data from one report to the next. Since many changes
were made as a result of Congressional or GAO pressure,
the author submits that the efforts of the Congressional
user to change the report format for their benefit have
only resulted in making the reports confusing. It should
be noted that the draft revision to DOD Instruction 7000.3
was completed in November 197^; however since that time
two change memos have been issued by the ASD (Comptroller).
The latest one, issued on 7 March, 1975, will require
another change to the 70OO.3 draft revision. The coor-
dination of all agencies required to "chop" this draft
will result in further delays to the publication on the
new DOD Instruction 7000.3.
The author strongly recommends that the Congress adopt
a "hands off" policy to the SAR and let the system function
to establish continuity and a baseline so that all con-
cerned can develop an understanding of the system. The
frustrations with the constant changes were best expressed
as follows
:
Our point is that we would like to manage with the SAR
as a useful tool rather than not manage by having lots
of people changing the system all the time. They (P/M)
get so concerned with that they never have time to
manage . 31







While the technical and schedule sections of the SAR
provide valuable management information, there are few,
if any, documents that evoke and arouse the emotions of
the Congressional and DOD Resource Managers as does the
cost section of the SAR. The author found a general dis-
agreement of opinion on the value of point cost estimates.
In general, it was observed that there was an overall
lack of knowledge on cost estimation throughout DOD.
B. DEFINITIONS
For the SAR, the cost baseline is either the Planning
Estimate (PE) or Development Estimate (DE) depending on
the stage of the procurement. The definition of these
two terms will be useful to the discussion:
Planning Estimate (PE) . The estimates of operational
technical characteristics, schedule and Program Acquisition
Cost (for both development and procurement) when approval
is given by the Secretary of Defense for program initia-
tion. Normally, an approved Development Concept Paper
(DCP) will be used as a source for the characteristics,
schedule and cost estimates; however in the absence of
a DCP, a Program Memorandum (PM) , a Program Change
Decision (PCD), Technical Development Plan (TDP) or some
similar document may be sued. The specific source docu-
ment will be identified in the report. The PE for
procurement will be reported until the initial production
contract is signed. Once a PE baseline is established
it will not be changed unless specific permission is
granted by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Development Estimate (DE) . The estimates of operational/
technical characteristics i schedule and Prog -am Acquisition
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Cost for both development and procurement when approval-
is given by the Secretary of Defense for the program to
move into full scale development. Normally an approved
DCP will be used as a source for the characteristics,
schedule, and cost estimates; however, in the absence of
a DCP, another document may be used and should be iden-
tified in the report. Development estimate baseline
figures for procurement may be revised when the initial
production contract is signed and should include ail
anticipated options, follow-on effort, etc. Once a DE
baseline is established it will not be changed unless
specific permission is granted by ASD (Comptroller) .32
C. DECISION POINTS
The decision points at which the Secretary of Defense
gives approval for program initiation and full scale
development are the DSARC I and DSARC II respectively
.
In questioning NAVCOMPT, ASD (PA&E) and project personnel
the author obtained some interesting observations relating
to the conflict and controversy surrounding cost base-
line estimates.
First, the cost estimates used in DSARC reviews were
normally derived from the DCP for the specific system.
The DCP was originated by the military service concerned
in draft for "comment" and "coordination" within OSD.
The DCP, after "coordination," was carried to the DSARC
and revised as necessary to reflect the modifications
accomplished during the DSARC. It was then sent to the
Secretary of Defense for "signature at which point it
consummated a decision. This same procedure now
^ 2 DOD Instruction 7OOO.3.

applies at all three major decision points in a weapons
33
systems' life.
Interviewees described the actual mechanics of cal-
culating a cost estimate to be one in which the P/M,
with the assistance of the cognizant Systems Command
Cost Analysis Branch, reviewed the contractor cost propo-
sal and submitted his best estimate of the total cost for
the system. The methodology universally used among the
P/Ms was an engineering cost estimate where the work
3^+
breakdown structure was analyzed down to Level j.
Engineering cost estimating was found to be a very "soft"
area. No Project Office questioned knew of any Navy or
DOD Instruction covering this type of cost estimating.
Essentially the P/M and SYSCOM cost shop were heavily
reliant on the contractor's estimate. This estimate was
presented in the DCP "draft" and, barring major difference
from the estimates of the Independent Parameteric Cost
Analysis Groups of OP-96D and OSD (PA&E) , the P/Ms estimate
emerged from the DSARC as the official forecast of system
cost in the DCP. The mechanics of cost estimating was
essentially the same at all decision points.
DOD Directive 5000.4 of 13 June 1973, established
the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) . Their
33 DOD Instruction 5000.2, 21 January 1975, "The Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) and the Defense Systems Ac-
quisition Review Council (DSARC) * .
3 DOD Instruction 7000.3*
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operations have been primarily parameteric estimating
during review and not the origination of cost estimates.
This will be discussed later.
D. PROJECT DYNAMICS
The author has gone to some length to demonstrate
how a PE or DE evolved. The reason was to show that
considerable effort goes into developing such an estimate.
There are two main problems associated with cost baselines.
First, all those interviewed agreed that accurate
cost estimating is extremely difficult, especially in a
major acquisition which may be six-ten years in length.
That difficulty can be easily demonstrated by asking any
home owner to compare the value of the home he paid
$35,000 for five years ago with its current $60,00-70,000
price tag. Most weapons systems involve a degree of
technical risk in advancing the "state of the art." Add
that fact to the economic uncertainties of recent years
and the job of accurate cost estimating for a ten year
program becomes impossible.
A related problem involves the very nature of the
evolution of a new system. The rapidly expanding technology
in weaponry continually produces new capabilities. Many
new subsystems can and do evolve during every phase of
a system. These advances promise to improve its capability
for countering the enemy threat. Ultimately, after some
of these changes are incorporated and the PE or DE is
revised to reflect the increased cost, the Congressional
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Staffs have interpretated this growth in the price as
"bad management .
"
The Congressional Staff attitude expressed to the
author was one which almost completely ignored this
dynamic nature of system evolution. Since actual systems
cost nearly always exceed estimated cost, one Congressional
Committee Staff member expressed his displeasure as follows
"He (the P/M) came here and asked for $2 million per copy
for his new system five years ago when asking for approval;
now today, he asks for $5 million per copy. Thats bad
management no matter what the system does! You can't
blame all that on inflation! "'-' The impact of inflation
will be discussed later but here again was the wide con-
ceptual gap in the users idea of what the SAR was giving
and the producers thought on what he was submitting.
E. ESTIMATING DIFFERENCES
Secondly, the difference in estimating procedures
caused problems. The P/M submitted an engineering cost
estimate and the reviewing group used parametric estimating
techniques . The author perceived that neither group under-
stood the others estimating technique very well and were
somewhat distrustful of the results. While the difference
in techniques offered some check and balance they made
it difficult to resolve differences in the estimates.




had priority and v/as accepted unless an obvious dis-
crepancy was discovered and could be proved to the
reviewers without doubt.
F. MOTIVATION
The author would be remiss if he did not point out
that there exists an excellent potential for contractor
and P/M "optimism" also in this area. Again, pessimism
on the part of the P/M would have resulted in added
pressure and possible reductions to his program or even
complete cancellation. Remembering that he (the P/M)
was rewarded for "making the system work" and, further,
that the contractor which fed him the data was rewarded
by getting the contract, the potential for optimistic
estimates was high. Due to the time constraints on this
effort the author was not able to examine this question.
The question of optimism on the part of the P/M and the
contractor in cost estimates appears to be a fruitful
area for future research. The author recommends that it
be adopted as a thesis topic to determine if and to what
extent the P/Ms and contractors submit "optimistic" cost




The author found at all levels a lack of appreciation
for the difficulty and importance of cost estimating.
The MARC Cost Panel concurred with this idea;
51

For Navy estimates of weapons system cost to become
fully adequate and have the maximum credibility with
DOD and Congress, the Navy, from the top down, must
devote more attention, emphasis, education, and personnel
resources to this subject in each of the SYSCOMs.^°
This educational process must, be extended on through
DOD and to the Congress. As we saw from the Congressional
Staff member comments and, as will be discussed later, they
(the Congressional Staff) place extreme importance on
the difference between the PE or DE and the current
estimate of the total cost of a system. Their views
express the opinion that the difference should be "zero!"
The staff members have argued that both the PE and DE
should be carried in the SAR through the complete acquisi-
tion. The author does not concur for these reasons:
1. There is apparent lack of understanding on the
part of the Congressional Staffs as to the tenta-
tive nature of the planning estimate and dynamics
of system evolution.
2. When both are displayed this would add to the
size of the SAR and could give an inaccurate
picture of the program by overemphasizing early
changes. These early changes are typical, de-
sirable and the very reason for having a con-
ceptual phase - to refine the system.
3. It would be of little management or analytical
value since comparing the production model of
the system to the conceptual model since in most
cases would be like comparing apples to oranges.
In most cases they are two vastly different systems
H. RECOMMENDATIONS
The cost baseline should continue in its current
status; display the PE for those systems which are
reported on prior to DSARC II and the DE only following
3 NMARC Report, Vol. 1, p. VII-13-
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DSARC II. A one time variance analysis should be pro-
vided for the SAR when the program changes from a PE
to a DE. This would provide for tracing back to the
projects conceptual phase for those who were interested.
Due to the dynamic nature of systems acquisition,
a range cost estimate should be provided in the SAR
rather than a point estimate. This would highlight
the truly tenuous nature of cost estimating and relieve
some of the pressure presently associated with "cost
growth.
"
The DOD should launch an extensive program to edu-
cate the Congress and the Defense Acquisition Team of
the nature, importance, and difficulty in accurate cost
estimating and provide the Navy with the assets it needs
to adequately staff their cost estimating organizations.
Since engineering cost estimates are so important
in determining the cost baseline for the program, the
author was concerned when no policy guidance on the
subject could be uncovered. In essence, the only check
on the P/Ms "best estimate": was the parameteric cost
estimate. Although the author has no evidence that
errors in engineering cost estimates have been the cause
for "cost overruns," the potential for that type of
situation certainly exists.
Some sort of policy or guidance concerning engineering
cost estimates is needed. "Should Cost," which is a DOD engi-
neering cost estimate offers one alternative to improve this
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area. Should this be unsuccessful, firmer guidance in
the form of a handbook or detailed instruction on en-
gineering cost estimates would be a most unpleasant,
but apparently necessary step. The author recognizes
that this would be an extremely difficult and major step
in dealing with contractors because the preparation of
an engineering cost estimate is an internal procedure
of great complexity. In considering this alternative,
if the potential benefits outv/eigh the costs in terms
of better estimates, reduced Congressional pressure on
the P/M and DOD , and an enhanced defense management image,
the handbook or instruction should be published.
ASD (I&L) Mendolia recognized the need for better
cost estimating. In an article concerning procurement
research he said:
Perhaps the time has come for a quantum jump - to leap-
frog the whole inventory of problems that bog down systems
procurement today - to take the bold step of devising
something completely new and different. Every time we
advance the state of the art technically, yesterday's
equipment becomes obsolete and the pricing experience
becomes obsolete right along with it. We are continually
gathering data banks on costs, but they are for yester-
day's equipment. What we need is some way to forecast
realistically what tomorrow's costs will be.-"*'
37 Mendolia* Author I., "How DOD's Procurement Insures Top
Quality Technology," Commander's Digest , Volume 16,
Number 19, November 197^.
^

VIII. CURRENT ESTIMATES AND VARIANCE ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
One of the functions of a management information system
is to compare what was planned with what has been achieved
to date, with estimates for completion. In the case
of complex weapons systems the schedule is fairly easy
to track. The performance may or may not be easily veri-
fied depending on the nature of the procurement. For the
area of cost, the SAR compares the Current Estimate (CE)
to the PE or DE and establishes a variance analysis to
provide some indication of the progress . While this
appears to be a fairly straight forward process, the con-
sideration of "what year" dollars, escalation, inflation,
and which cost estimate to use quickly makes the cost
analysis a most complex issue. For the purposes of com-
parison the SAR CE is defined as:
Current Estimate . Enter the best current estimate of
cost to buy the service inventory objective. These
estimates will be based upon guidance given the Project
Manager by the DOD Component Chief and Secretary of the
DOD Component. They should be objective assessments of
program costs. Any evidence of cost change must be in-
dicated at the earliest possible date. If the DOD
Component wishes, the CE may also be reflected in con-
stant dollars, by footnote. All costs should be escal-
lated in accordance with established policy on v/eapons
system costing and inflation factors used to compute
CE should be specifically identified. 3°
o o




The author found that most projects rely heavily
on the appropriate SYSCOM Cost Group to either provide
the basic data to the P/M and his staff or to check the
data should the P/M opt to prepare his own figures.
To gain insight into the procedure of preparing
the CE the author attempted to visit the NAVAIR Cost
Shop. The reply was that they didn't have time. That
"being the case the conclusion that they were understaffed
would be indicated. The author was allowed to review the
cost worksheets for the December, 197^-» SAR of a major
NAVAIR Project. An informal survey of several other pro-
jects revealed that this example was typical of the
methodology. Table II is a ficticious, hypothetical
example of the worksheet that the Project Office would
use. It is presented only to demonstrate the format and
methodology. In compiling this worksheet the originator
(NAVAIR Cost Shop) uses historical cost, existing con-
tracts, contractor estimates, contractor labor agreements,
learning curve effects, and all factors that are quanti-
fiable. The ASD (Comptroller) issued the following
guidance to the Service Secretaries concerning SAR cost
estimates:
The 'best estimate' should include not only economic
factors but also production factors including the learning
curve effect.-"
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Their estimates are usually calculated in current year
dollars and passed to the Project Office in a format similar
to Table II with additional program item lines as appropriate.
It should be emphasized that Table II is greatly simplified
to facilitate its use as an example. The actual worksheet
examined contained 25 Program Item lines over a 12 year
period.
The P/M is then responsible to use these inputs and
escalate and/or de-escalate the values to whatever base
year is called for in the existing SAR submission policies.
The base year for reporting purposes has varied from one
reporting period to the next. Base years have included
the current year and the year of program approval
.
C. ESCALATION
Escalation factors are provided to the P/M by OSD.
Table III is the list of current escalation rates as
specified by ASD (Comptroller) for the various categories
of procurements . The appropriate economic factor is applied
to total for each class of expenditures in a fiscal year.
The historical and forecast expenditures by fiscal year
are then totalled to arrive at the P/Ms "best estimate"
for the total expenditure on the system.
One set of constraints on the cost section is that
the P/Ms cost estimates must match the current years
approved budget and the figures in the FYDP. The author







YEAR PROCUREMENT RDT&S SHIPBUILDING
1974 83.4 89.8 86.2
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976 110.0 109.0 113.0
197 115.4 113.6 120.3
1977 120.4 118.3 127.4
1978 127.4 124.9 138.1
1979 132.5 130.1 147.2
1980 137.5 135.3 156.6
1981 142.7 140.7 166.7
Per Year
Thereafter 3.8 4.0^ 6A%





was told that considerable effort was expended during
the SAR review process to insure that the SAR estimates
did not conflict with either of the fore mentioned documents.
D. VARIANCE ANALYSIS
Variance analysis in the SAR is provided for all three
major areas; schedule, performance, and cost. The first
two areas require nothing more than brief statements con-
cerning the difference between the CE and the DE or PE.
The program acquisition cost is quite a different
story. DOD Instruction 7000*3 specified that cost should
be identified separately for development, procurement, and
construction. Additionally cost variance must be classified








The author will not discuss each class of variance due
to the time constraints on this paper. They were presented
only to give the reader a feel for the complexity the SAR
has acquired since its inception. During the previously
mentioned analysis of the SAR files of major programs the
author had considerable difficulty in tracking differences
from one quarter to the next. As an example, a number in
the variance section would change. No supporting documenta-
tion or calculations were presented; only an explanation
such as "change due to estimating refinement." After
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reviewing a large number of SARs the author was not able
to gather a great deal of meaningful information from
this section in each SAR. A considerable number of the
people interviewed felt that the variance analysis was one
of the least useful sections of the SAR and none of them
said that they used it. Currently the variance analysis
may consume as much as JO-^-Ofo of the pages in a SAR. One
SAR producer told me that he spends, by far, the largest
amount of his time in SAR preparation balancing and cor-
recting the numbers in the variance section. He felt that
the data were not especially valuable and was somewhat
frustrated by his perception of uselessness after so much
work in preparation.
The current SARs are considerably larger and more
complex than the first group of SARs submitted in 1969*
The author had the opportunity to examine the packet of
initial SARs that were sent to the Congress. Most averaged
one-two pages total. In comparing the two generations of
the SAR the immediate impression was that current SARs
are far too complex.
E. RECOMMENDATION
The author believes that due to the difficulty in
following program variance analysis and its apparent
marginal usefulness the variance analysis sections of the
SAR should be deleted. This would simplify the reports
and improve the readability with little loss of ability
to present the status of the program.
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IX. ESCALATION AND COST GROWTH
A. GENERAL
The study of escalation and cost growth is extensive
enough to provide the material for more than one thesis.
The author was not able to investigate the subjects in
detail and will only briefly introduce and discuss the
problems to demonstrate how volatile the SAR becomes as
a result of the differences of opinion on these two issues
B. ESCALATION
As mentioned in the previous chapter the p/M applied
the escalation factors supplied by the ASD (Comptroller)
to the cost data breakdown by year to derive the total
program cost. Obviously, the factors applied could change
the total program cost by a significant amount. To empha-
size this point during periods when actual inflation rates
exceeded DOD projections a sensitivity analysis was added
to the total program cost section of the SAR which pro-
vided a cost differential factor to add or subtract from
the total program cost estimate to adjust for a different
escalation rate
.
An example of this type of impact was observed by the
author during the SAR analysis phase of this research.
A difference of only 2.% in the escalation index resulted
in a $50 million cost increment to acquire the target
inventory for a system whose estimated total cost was
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slightly in excess of $1 billion. It can be easily seen
then that a small forecasting error during the unexpected
"double digit inflation" of 197^ resulted in devastating
growth to systems costs as will be discussed in xhe "Pre-
vious Rates" and "Impact of Realism" sections of this
chapter.
C. INFLATION AND ESCALATION
Another "soft" area in the SAR was the entire concept
of escalation and inflation. The enclosure to DOD Instruc-
tion 7000*3 (Paragraph II E3) seemed to imply that the
two terms were interchangable . In discussing the procedures
for computing the current estimate it said:
All costs should be escalated in accordance with es-
tablished policy on weapons system costing and inflation
factors used to compute CE should be specifically identified
During many of the interviews the author asked for an
explanation of the difference of the two. Most interviewees
stated that they didn't know what or if there was distinc-
tion. One felt that escalation could be divided into
economic and non-economic escalation. Non-economic esca-
lation was cost growth associated with items such as
change orders and quantity adjustments. He stated that
economic escalation was attributed to factors such as
inflation or price index increases
.
Another interviewee said that escalation was any cost
growth. Inflation, in his view, was that portion of
escalation due to the increase in price levels; i.e., the
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change in the cost of a "standard market basket" of con-
sumer goods or increase in some price index.
The author contends that the two terms are intended
to be interchangable for the purposes of the SAR. In the
SAR variance analysis, inflation was in the economic change
category (page 69) . However economic change in enclosure
1 to DOD 7000.3 (paragraph II G^) was defined:
Economic Change . A change due to the operation of one or
more factors of the economy. This includes specific
contract changes related to economic escalation and the
economic impact portion of quantity changes not accounted
for by the original cost-quantity relationships used to
calculate cost-quantity change variance. Constant or
current dollar amounts in program estimates to reflect
(1) altered price levels and (2) definitized contract
amounts
.
This subject provides another fruitful thesis research
area. The author was time limited but felt that a brief
introduction would be beneficial in highlighting the lack
of understanding in this area during economic fluctuations.
Inflation has been such a provocative and emotional sub-
ject that no matter how it was handled in the SAR or any
other reporting system there would be controversy gen-
erated over the methodology and results. The SAR users
(Congressional Committees) have been particularly critical
of inflation in the SAR. They felt the P/M was trying to
blame all cost growth on inflation. The staffs felt
that inflation was not solely to blame. Since the exact
inflation impact could not be identified in the SAR, the




While the author could obtain no direct evidence,
there was a strong presumption that this suspicion on
the part of the Congressional Staffs led to pressure on
DOD which culminated in the 7 March 1975, ASD Comptroller
Memorandum requiring two SAR cost formats. One estimate
will be in current year dollars. The other in base year
dollars; with the base year, in most cases, the year the
project was first authorized. The apparent intent was
that, if the P/M de-escalates all costs (including the CE)
back to the base year, the difference between the DE and
CE in those same year dollars would be the actual cost
growth not attributable to inflation. While on the surface
the concept seems to be sound, the familiar questions of - in
what year dollars do you price a contract change , what
deflation factors whould be used, and which cost baseline
again become extremely important. As we will see in the
next few sections of this chapter, the compounding effects
of a small escalation/de-escalation rate difference lead
to significant dollar differences over the 8-15 life span
of most SAR projects. The author questions whether any
meaningful data will be produced with the two formats.
A phone check with two Project Offices during the final
stages of the writing of this thesis has revealed that
there is considerable disagreement over the above questions.
Further, an extraordinary amount of time has gone into
the preparation of the extra format. The concept of the
cost and value of information should be considered. The
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author recommends a study to evaluate the use and worth of
this information. It is possible that the Congressional
Committee Staffs, in an attempt to fulfill their per-
cieved role of reducing budget requests to give the il-
lusion of control (Berry and Peckham, p.57)i have gone
too far in reviewing past data attempting to highlight
"bad management." While those historical data are valuable
in making program decisions, the main emphasis in program
management and review should be the future or completion
of the project. If the decision is reached to continue
a program the efforts should be concentrated on optimizing
the remainder of the program rather than focusing on the




Several project personnel were questioned as to
whether or not they felt the contractor was "inflating"
the cost estimates he provided. The majority response
indicated they didn't know or weren't sure. This area
was one in which the author recommends immediate investi-
gation. If the contractor is "inflating" his cost
estimates for future portions of the program and the P/M
later applies an escalation factor the resulting cost
estimate is in error.
E. PREVIOUS RATES
Prior to the June 197^ SARs the maximum escalation
rate permitted by DOD was k.5% annually. The k.5fo rate
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was for FY 1975 followed by 3.1% for FY I976 and beyond.
These indices were maintained despite the fact that the
economy as a whole was experiencing an inflation rate
far in excess of that. For example:
In December (197*0 the all commodities WPI (Wholesale
Price Index) was at 171.5* 20 .9% higher than a year
earlier.^- *
In December (1973) t the all commodities, WPI was 1*4-5. 3>
18
.
2% higher than it was a year earlier. 2
The September (197*0 CPI (Consumer Price Index) was
12.1% higher than a year ago. ^3
These factors were well above authorized DOD estimates.
As an example the WPI index for the base year of 1967
provided an index value of 100. When the author compared
the 197*+ WPI index number 171.5 with a standard escalation/
de-escalation chart provided as Table IV for a 7 year
period (1967-197*+) the average escalation rate factor was
8fo; approximately two to three times what had been used
in previous SAR cost estimates. Even using the CPI
number 151*9 from Table V gives an average yearly esca-
lation rate above 6%.
The author intends to merely introduce this subject
but as can be readily seen it provides a fruitful area
for further research into its application to the SAR.
Li *
Emphasis added. U.S. Department of Labor, "Wholesale
Prices and Price Indexes," December 197*+ 1 P. 1-
**2
U.S. Department of Labor, "Wholesale Prices and Price
Indexes," December, 1973 > P« 1«
*n U.S. Department of Labor, "Consumer Price Index De-
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A thorough investigation of this aspect of the SAR
system, while eminently worthwhile, is beyond the scope
of this study.
The reason for these lower rates of escalation could
not be actually determined and can only be speculated upon
by the author. It appeared to be a political constraint
imposed for the reason that a major government agency,
such as DOD, could not be permitted to forecast higher
rates of inflation without the prospect of contractors,
labor unions, and others responding in such a way as
to making them come to pass. While this may have proved
politically expedient the result was an extraordinary
increase in cost estimates when more realistic values
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract o f
the U.S. , 197^i P- *K>4.
J U.S. Department of Commerce, "Survey of Current Business,"
Vol. 54 #12, December 197^, p. s-2.
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were used. The large cost growths associated with such
reassessment resulted in an outcry from the Congress.
F. IMPACT OF REALISM
When more realistic rates were applied such as 11%
for FY 1975. 8% in 1976, decreasing to k.3% in I98O and
3.7% annually thereafter, the grand total cost estimate
for kk major DOD acquisitions rose to a total of $16.9
billion; from approximately $90 billion to $106 billion.
Of that increase Navy programs were responsible for $7.
3
billion from a baseline of $50 billion. In commenting
on the increases ASD (PA&E) Sullivan re-affirmed his
opinion of the lack of understanding on Capitol Hill as
to the tentative nature of cost estimates. He forecast
that the Pentagon will "be told by some members of Congress
that that' s how bad we managed between the first and second
quarters." His prophesy was born out as evidenced by
the increased number of inquiries by Congressmen, Senators,
and their staffs. A SAR Improvement Group was established
within DOD to try to ease some of the pressure. The GAO
conducted another study of the SAR. Since that time
several new change memoranda for DOD Instruction 7000.3
have emerged. A draft revision to the same instruction
is currently in routing for coordination and publication.
While it would be difficult to tie each of these directly
"Aerospace Daily," Vol. 69 #22, 2 October 197^, P- 169.
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to the revised escalation indices the fact remains that
they followed shortly after the public announcement
concerning the new cost estimates.
Although the rates indicated in Table III may have
come close to what actually happened for what is now
known of the 197^-1975 period, the reader might challenge
the rates indicated for future years. Speculation about
the political constraints, again in terms of limiting
those indicies, could be well founded. The political
problem of DOD "officially" embracing future inflation
rates considerably higher than those then being experienced
was a very sticky one. More significant was the economic
uncertainty in general. That subject will be discussed
in the succeeding chapter.
G. COST GROWTH
Cost growth, in simple arithmetic terms, was the
difference between the current estimate and the baseline
estimate. As has been previously discussed, both elements
of the cost growth equation (CE and DE) were very "soft"
and subject to ranges depending on what escalation indicies
were used. The engineering cost estimating problems
increase the uncertainty as to what the actual cost
growth was
.
This cost grov/th was also extremely difficult to trace
from one quarterly report to the next because of the
rapidly changing format and guidance in computing estimates.
Many readers of the SAR were not on the routing for new
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change memoranda issued by ASD (Comptroller) and therefore
had no knowledge of the many changes. As the author
found during his own investigation, without the current
guidance and all the changes in between, it was nearly
impossible to refer to DOD Instruction 7000. 3 and trace
the cost growth.
In essence . then, the current guidance had a significant
impact on the current cost status of the program in the
SAR . The total program cost estimate could vary over a
wide range, depending on the projected escalation. Due
to the dynamic nature of weapons system evolution, the
baseline, in many cases, was not an accurate reflection
of the true system capabilities and components. As we saw,
during development it was subject to many changes. This
is not to say that it shouldn't have changed, merely that
it did and this made it extremely difficult to put "handles"
on the process with which the Congress could evaluate the




A brief description of the environment in which the
SAR and the P/M must live and function would be beneficial
to the reader prior to summarizing the findings.
A. CONGRESS
The U.S. budget in the past several years has under-
gone a transition in that Defense no longer gets the
largest share of the annual budget. "In the current
Federal budget 70% of the dollar expenditures are uncon-
trollable." ' Most Defense acquisitions fall into the
30% that is controllable. Since considerable Congressional
review occurs prior to appropriating these monies, the
SAR has emerged as a primary information tool to transmit
the status of particular programs to the Congress. Berry
and Peckham reported that the Congress sees their role
as one of cutting the funds requested for some programs to
ensure that the illusion of control is projected. In this
light many Congressionally Requested Changes to the SAR
format and content appear designed to make spotting problems
and cost growth easier. This was the apparent motive
behind the 7 March 1975 ASD (Comptroller) change memo-
randum to the SAR which called for de-escalating all costs
and estimates back to the program base year. They felt
^7 Unpublished speech by Senator Barry Goldwater, 11 April




that then the Current Estimates could be compared to
Development Estimates or Planning Estimates in the same
year dollars for a simple calculation of cost growth.
The Congressional proponents of this methodology base
their analysis and program evaluation on two estimates.
They had little appreciation for the tentative nature of
those estimates or the dynamics of project evolution.
As was previously shown, the planning (escalation) factors
determined to a large extent the cost estimate for com-
pletion of the program.
B. CONTRACTORS
The contractors in many defense industries are no
longer as dependent on DOD business as they once were.
This is especially true in the Navy's unique area of
shipbuilding. The past ten years has seen a significant
decline in the number of American shipbuilders. The ship-
building industry has long suffered the inefficiencies
associated with the complexity of constructing a state
of the art "man-of-war." The shipyards currently have a
large backlog of orders for oil tankers and ore carriers.
These vessels are much less complicated to build than
combatant ships. Additionally, commercial business does
not commit the contractor to costly and complicated
management assistance programs such as Government Quality
Assurance, Military Standards/Specifications, and CSCSC
(DOD Instruction 7000.2 series). Consequently the Navy
7^

is having difficulty in obtaining competition for some of
its major contractors. In this less than competitive
environment there is not as much motivation for accurate
cost estimates; especially in the cost-plus type contracting
situation. There are special problems in shipbuilding that
do not exist in the aircraft or missile programs. Fore-
most is the time element. The complexity in shipbuilding
would make cost estimating most difficult in a "sterile"
environment free from inflation over a 10-15 year period
required for completion. It is impossible when a new
shipbuilding program pushes the state of the art. Add to
that the violent economic conditions of the past two years
coupled with shortages of basic raw materials and the ever
escalating demands by labor and the contractors, and a point
estimate of what the Number 7 Trident Submarine will cost
6-8 years from now is very "soft." These appear to be
the ingredients for guaranteed cost growth.
C. CORPORATE PLANNING
To amplify the plight of the P/M in dealing with the
contractor during periods of economic uncertainty, major
changes have apparently transpired in the past year,
especially in the area of long range corporate planning.
Many major companies (including some major defense con-
tractors) have forecast continuing high inflation (con-
trary to ASD (Comptroller) guidance), continuing tight
money, and high long term interest rates. Some are
IS

revising their planning to include the "worst case" which
in certain instances is a full depression. This has been
difficult due to the opposing, long standing traditional
economic model built on a straight course of optimism.
Several quotes from a recent special report on this sub-
ject are worth reviewing:
As risks mount, companies routinely demand of their
businesses a higher return on investment.
In line with trying to reduce the risk exposure in
the company, and at the same time not lose any of the
entreprenenrship, we (General Electric, a major DOD
contractor) have moved toward more organically grown,
smaller-in-size , larger-in-number ventures.
Just predicting the future worth of the dollar is a
major planning headache. American Standard (Corporation)
encourages managers to translate dollars in forward
plans into ounces of gold, not only to keep them aware
of the continuing erosion of the dollar but to dramatize
the need to look at market forecasts in terms of physical
units rather than paper money, which overstates market
growth.^""
These quotes were mentioned to emphasize the wide span




The DOD guidance on economic escalation of J.lfo
beyond I98O couldn't be classified as "continuing high
inflation." The concept of "smaller-in-size, larger-in-
number" ventures can't refer to major acquisition programs;
which means General Electric may become less interested in
J*8
. .
"Corporate Plannmg-Piercmg Future Fog m the Executive
Suite," Business Week




DOD contracts. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(ASPR) and the Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement have indicated a trend for placing more, not
less, risk on the contractor. As for the contractors
higher return on investment, the audit agencies of each
service, the DOD, and the GAO are all growing in size
and importance. They carefully review contractor records
to verify all cost data. There is a contract renegotiation
board to ensure that a contractor's profits are not
excessive.
E. ESTIMATE OF SAR IMPACT
What is the impact in Congress when a program reports
a significant cost growth in its SAR? While no firm data
could "be gathered on this question, the discussion was
deferred to this section because the environment has a
significant impact on the author's answer to this question.
First, the SAR is not a decision making document. The
interviewees almost unanimously agreed that no decisions
are made based on the information in the SAR. The reasons
cited were that the SAR was not timely enough and that
the PPBS system plus the annual budget hearings provide
the procedures for the majority of the decisions concerning
a program, Remembering that the SAR's mission was to
inform, the purpose of reporting cost growth would merely
be to highlight this information to the Congress.
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The recent course of events when a program suffers
cost growth has been to reduce the numbers of the system
bought and/or lengthen the program cycle in hopes of
later approval of additional funds. It would be difficult
to forecast that pattern changing, unless it became more
restrictive!
F. OUTLOOK FOR THE SAR
In the midst of these problem areas, the
P/M will be under more pressure than ever to reduce
cost growth and control cost. The SAR will become more
prominent as the Congress and its Committees expand their
base of direct control over the procurement team. The
author sadly forecasts more, not fewer, changes to the
SAR format and reporting procedures as the Congress strives
to gain the information they perceive is required to
exercise this control.
Until improved appreciation is gained at all levels
of the tenuous nature and difficulty of accurate cost
estimating for a ten year program in an uncertain environ-
ment the SAR will continue to exist in a cloud of contro-
versy and continual change.
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XI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. FINDINGS
The author found that there was considerable disa-
greement on a number of the issues including the role
of the SAR , the review process, the question of accurate
status reporting, and the definitions of escalation and
inflation. In general there was little appreciation at
the user level for either the dynamic nature of a major
acquisition or the tenuous nature and difficulty of
point cost estimates.
The queue for the review process was created by the
fact that a small group of people essentially review all
Navy SARs; they are physically time constrained from
speeding the process to any great degree. An associated
problem was the frequently changed reporting guidance
which constrained the P/M to waiting until the "as of
date" to commence SAR preparation thus contributing to
the length of the review process. The SARs are untimely
in terms of their arrival at the Congress. This appeared
not to be a significant factor since it was discovered
that the SAR does not drive any program decisions.
At the P/M level, the incentive for "optimism" exists
in terms of career rewards. Very few projects present
their status as "complete optimism"; i.e., only minor
or no problems. The P/M used engineering cost estimating
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techniques for calculating baseline cost estimates. Slight
differences in escalation rates used for cost estimating
could produce large changes in the estimated price for
most systems. Until recently, unrealistic escalation
rates produced unrealistic low estimates. More significant
was the large impact of applying more realistic escalation
rates to program costs. In general, the P/M and his staff
had a dislike for the SAR due to the large amount of time
required to prepare, review, revise, and ansv/er questions
concerning the SAR.
Overall, the SAR has changed considerably since its
inception. The original Congressional SARs were a maximum
of two pages each. Now the SAR has grown so much that a
13 page limit was imposed. It has also increased in com-
plexity and now includes cost, schedule, and performance




The author concluded that, due to the problems of
varying escalation rates, which compound cost growth,
questionable cost estimates, and the dynamic nature of
system evolution, the SAR was only reasonably effective
in accurately presenting the cost status of a project.
The amount of review seemed to insure that it was accurate
for the present but that it may not show all the problems.




There is considerable room for improvement of the SAR
system, especially, in terms of cost estimating and its
understanding, SAR timeliness, frequency of revision of
reporting guidance, variance analysis, and overall com-
plexity. The succeeding section will list some specific
recommendations for improvement.
The area of cost data computation was a very "soft"
one . Since cost data for the SARs were computed or moni-
tored by the appropriate SYSCOM cost shop, there should
be firm guidance in terms of standardized estimating
procedures
.
The SARs arrival at their ultimate user, the Congress,
could not be termed timely (60 days following "as of" date)
This issue was tied directly to the review process. The
author concluded that it would be very difficult to
expedite SAR submission under the current practice of
submitting them in a group.
The review process was needed to provide some degree
of standardization among programs and ensure that SAR
data were in agreement with FYDP and budget data. In
addition, without the file of change memoranda it was
difficult if not impossible to track changes in the SARs
of any program.
The author concluded that the SAR should retain its
present role of providing the status as of a date rather
rather than being an expanded "program highlights"
document only, highlighting problem areas. This was
81

based on the important function the SAR was filling; pro-
viding high ranking Navy and DOD officials with data
necessary to improve management of the several programs.
That is not to say that major problems should not be
noted in the SAR; however the inclusion of every potential
problem would introduce many middle layers of management
and suppress P/M initiative and aggressive management
techniques
.
In the same light, the P/M should not report directly
to Congress with the SAR. The fact that the procurement
team is a military organization makes it necessary that
the superiors of the P/M (Navy and DOD) review the inputs
to ensure concurrence with budget data and the established
priorities of the entire Defense establishment.
The author concluded that point cost estimates are
almost worthless in the uncertain economic conditions,
long lived programs , and the rapidly changing inflation
that have recently been experienced.
Overall the author believes the SAR is too complex and
time consuming in its preparation. The author concluded
that the concept of the SAR or any similar information
document is a sound one; however, the SAR user must
recognize the inherent limitations on comparing two
estimates to provide an exact measure of cost growth and
management evaluation. The author concluded that the
economic uncertainties and technological advances during
a long term major acquisition will result in changes and
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cost growth. Attention should be focused on those
decisions concerning the future of the program. Since
the magnitudes of the estimate to complete is a direct
function of the escalation indicies the author would "be
most interested in the rates the Congress would recommend
for use.
The NPS Library needs to be expanded to include more
procurement literature since the System Acquisition
Curriculum has received more attention and interest at
high levels. Specifically the "Aerospace Daily" Newspaper
should be ordered. Most important is an updated file of
DOD and Navy Instructions which are invaluable reference
material for student research.
Many of the areas examined and some of those not
examined in this thesis require further research. Specific




1. The SAR should retain its current role; an "as of
date" status and not strictly a problem highlights
document.
2. The P/M should not report directly to Congress with
the SAR. The concept of review should be retained to
ensure POM, PDM, FYDP, and budget data are in agreement.
3. The Congress should consider the issue of SAR timeliness
If the current system is unsatisfactory due to late
SAR arrival the alternative of "steady stream" sub-
mission is recommended. This would still involve
quarterly reporting for all projects but instead of
submitting at the quarters end, approximately two
reports per week would be submitted and reviewed.
^+. The Congress should develop a "hands-off" policy with
respect to the SAR. The continual requests to DOD for
SAR format and content changes has destroyed the
continuity in the reports, made them difficult to pre-
pare and read. Specifically the ? March 1975 ASD
(Comptroller) Memorandum requiring two cost sections
should be rescinded immediately; one cost section is
sufficient. Continued attempts to make the SAR "all
things to all men" by continual changes will result
in it "being nothing to everyone."
8^4-

5. The Congress should educate itself on the tenuous
nature and uncertainty in cost estimates. To that
end it is recommended that a cost range not a point
estimate "be included in the SAR.
6. The Navy and DOD should consider some policy or
guidance concerning engineering cost estimates. An
expanded "Should-Cost" program offers one alternative
to improving this area. Another, and more drastic
option, would be a detailed instruction or handbook
on engineering cost estimating. Either would be a
major departure from current practices.
7. Research is recommended in the following SAR or SAR
related areas
:
Effects of P/M rotations on SAR reporting.
To what extent do the P/M and contractors submit
"optimistic" cost baseline estimates either intentionally
or due to improper techniques?
Do contractors include inflation in their cost
estimates which are in turn escalated by the P/M - in
effect compounding the inflation?
What inflation/escalation rates should be used for
future predictions?
What are the definitions and proper uses of inflation
and escalation?
8. Only one cost baseline estimate should be carried in
the SAR; the PE prior to DSARC II (if applicable) then
the DE following DSARC II. A one time change analysis
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should be included to explain the difference be-
tween the two.
9. The detailed variance analysis sections of the SAR
should be eliminated to enhance the readability and
understanding of the report while reducing its
complexity.
10. DOD should not restrict the SAR producer to an es-
calation rate 1/3 to 1/2 of what the current economic
inflation rate is demonstrating. This results in
unrealistic cost estimates and increased pressure when
the realistic indicies are applied.
11. To enhance the understanding of the SAR, ASD (Comp-
troller) should revise DOD 7000.3 for each change
of the reporting criteria rather than sending memo-
randa to the service secretaries.
12. The NPS Library should be funded for additional sup-
port to the SAM student. In particular, "Aerospace
Daily" and current files of DOD and Navy Instructions
should be maintained for more effective support of
student research. This is especially true in an era
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